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Abstract 
This article discusses the attempt undertaken by several development aid agencies since the 
turn of the century to integrate political economy assessments into their decision making on 
development assistance. The article discusses three such attempts: the Drivers of Change 
adopted by the UK’s Department for International Development, the Strategic Governance 
and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) developed by the Dutch Directorate General for 
International Cooperation and the new thinking on political economy analysis, policy reform 
and political risk advanced by the World Bank. On the basis of a political-economic 
interpretation of development agencies, two main factors are found to hinder the successful 
application of political economy assessment. In the first place, the agencies’ professional 
outlook leads them to see development in primarily technical terms. In the second place, the 
nature of incentives for development professionals leads them to resist the implementation of 
political economy analyses. 
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Introduction 
During the 1990s, donor agencies started to realise that development policy involves more 
than adherence to macro-economic fundamentals, which had been the major precept of the 
Washington Consensus. The awareness that non-economic factors were important produced a 
wave of publications on the centrality  of ‘governance’ and led to a focus on institutions. 
Under the Post-Washington Consensus, which was a response to the exclusive emphasis of 
its predecessor on macro-economic policies, the proper organisation of social and political life 
became the focal point in the thinking about governance and development. The main 
reflection of the change of focus since the late 1990s was the increasing popularity of the term 
‘good governance’. Despite the adoption of the term, much of the governance literature – in 
particular the more policy-oriented work done by of the World Bank – remained grounded in 
an essentially depoliticised framework. The challenge for policy makers was defined, 
certainly in the case of the Bank, as ‘building institutions for markets’. This concern was 
epitomised in the title of the 2002 edition of the Bank’s flagship publication, the World 
Development Report.2 
Following the World Bank’s approach to governance, many development agencies have 
tended to orientate their governance programmes on relatively technical issues, such as public 
sector management, public finance and decentralisation. In their support of governance reform 
programmes, the agencies were preoccupied with the sequencing of reforms rather than with 
the concrete impacts that such reforms were having on the power relations in the countries 
concerned.3 
As argued elsewhere,4 many development agencies gradually came to appreciate that 
governance involves more than a concern with formal mechanisms and institutional 
arrangements. The agencies started to realise that reality did not conform to the models that 
were applied. They recognised that power relations and ‘informal’ patterns of governance 
were an important factor for explaining why well-intended reforms had not succeeded. They 
became aware that the analysis of development processes, as well as policy making on and 
implementation of development assistance, require a better understanding of informal 
relations and social networks of power. 
Calls for a better understanding of underlying power structures and the causes of deep-
rooted political conflicts – often cast in terms of the need for ‘political economy analyses’ – 
resulted in the development of various instruments that aim to capture governance realities by 
‘looking behind the façade’.5 The attention for political economy was inspired, to a 
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considerable extent, by the growing recognition in various development agencies of the 
limited use of the governance approach that had been adopted under the influence of World 
Bank thinking, and that was perceived as being highly apolitical.  
This article discusses the struggle of the donor community with the application of political-
economy analysis to governance issues. In particular, the ensuing discussion focuses on the 
paradox that donor agencies stress the need to engage in political-economy analyses but, at 
the same time, appear to be largely unable to use the insights derived from such analyses. The 
article focuses on three agencies: the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), the Dutch Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) and the World 
Bank.  
This article argues that an understanding of why development agencies are apparently 
unable to apply the outcomes of political-economy analysis requires a theoretical 
interpretation of the very political economy of the aid agencies themselves. This theoretical 
interpretation needs to take into account the way in which donor agencies function in relation 
to their environment, as well as the main operational features of those agencies. On the basis 
of the notions of epistemic communities and organisational incentives, derived from the 
disciplines of international relations and public administration, the argument of the article is 
that the difficulty of development agencies to use political economy approaches stems from 
their conception of what is proper development policy. For most agencies, development is 
about improving (poor) peoples’ livelihoods, either in terms of income or social development 
indicators (with the Millennium Development Goals as the pinnacle of the current policy 
consensus). Development policies are conceived, first and foremost, in terms of the 
instruments to achieve these targets. Agencies are primarily interested in ‘doing 
development’, which implies implementing projects and programmes successfully. Although 
they are concerned about the political context in which they operate, they feel they should not 
themselves be concerned with politics in their partner countries. The development agencies 
continue to operate effectively as ‘anti-politics machines’6 and this is why they experience an 
almost insurmountable difficulty in taking political assessments seriously. 
The next section contains an attempt to build a general theoretical political-economy 
framework on the basis of notions derived from international relations and organisation 
theory: epistemic communities and organisational incentives. The following three sections 
then analyse the instruments for political-economy analysis that were introduced by the three 
development agencies mentioned above: the Drivers of Change adopted by DFID, the 
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Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) developed by DGIS and the new 
thinking on political economy analysis, policy reform and political risk advanced by the 
World Bank. The final section formulates some conclusions. 
 
Understanding Donor Agencies 
The continuing discussion on the purposes of aid indicates that the jury is still out on the 
question as to what motivates governments to give aid. As Lancaster  has made clear in her 
much-cited work on foreign aid, ‘development’ is clearly only one among various purposes of 
aid.7 On the basis of a set of key policy documents of leading international development 
agencies, former ODI Director Simon Maxwell has usefully summarised the key elements of 
the current development agenda as a ‘new meta-narrative’. According to Maxwell, the new 
mantra of development assistance is characterised by acceptance of the Millennium 
Development Goals as an ‘over-arching framework’, linking these to national Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, which are to be endorsed by World Bank and IMF, ‘sound’ macro-
economic policies and trade liberalisation, proper public expenditure management and 
harmonised aid aimed at improving governance.8 
 Recent accounts of development agencies have stressed that the professionals working in 
these organisations often find it difficult to come to terms with politics in the countries they 
are posted to.9 One major cause of the seemingly apolitical orientation of many development 
professionals is that they are part of an ‘epistemic community’ that is motivated by the 
common endeavour of reducing or eradicating poverty and empowering the poorest parts of 
the population in developing countries.10 Development agencies work on the basis of a shared 
set of understandings of and values about processes of development. Their ‘institutional 
ethos’ derives mainly from their commitment to ‘making poverty history’ and improving the 
quality of life of people in developing countries.11 With this commitment comes an interest in 
‘doing development’, which is equated with implementing projects and programmes 
successfully. Although staff are concerned about the political context they operate in, they 
usually feel they should not themselves be concerned with politics in the partners countries. 
As James Ferguson pointed out over two decades ago, most development agencies continue to 
operate effectively as ‘anti-politics machines’, which explains why they experience great 
difficulty in taking political analyses seriously.12 
Furthermore, the nature of the work of development agencies implies that their staff is 
subject to particular incentive structures. As they dealing with complex realities, it is hard for 
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development agencies to define and measure their output. Despite the recent emphasis of aid 
effectiveness, the main instruments for aid agencies to monitor performance of individual 
staff members remain linked to the commitment and disbursement of funds – ‘moving 
money’, as Easterly13 called it –, the management of projects and programmes and the 
production of reports and memos.14 To the extent that assessment of results is possible, 
project and programme evaluations are usually very time consuming and their findings get 
published long after the fact.15 The focus of incentives for staff of aid bureaucracies on 
observable outputs such as disbursement activity, management and written work, brings about 
an orientation of staff on the technical aspects of their work, as their advancement within the 
organisation depends on assessments of their performance in financial and project or 
programme management. Overall, there seem to be very few incentives for staff to learn from 
past activities and gain in-depth knowledge about the country they are working in.16 
Next to the implications of the internal working of development agencies on staff 
behaviour, changes in the external political environment of such agencies have led to the 
prevalence of more a technocratic outlook among managers and decision makers. Concerns 
about the effectiveness of development assistance policies, coupled with a general move to 
enhanced ‘accountability’ of government agencies, have led to the introduction of monitoring 
and evaluation tools deriving from New Public Management. So-called ‘new development 
management’17 spurred the adoption of techniques that aim at minimising risk and controlling 
the behaviour of public servants. Examples of this trend are the mushrooming of evaluations – 
labelled ‘evaluitis’ by Frey18 – and the introduction of new accountability instruments such as 
the Public Service Agreements for international development in the United Kingdom and the 
spread of a ‘counter-bureaucracy’ aimed at the management of aid programmes in the United 
States.19 The techniques of ‘new development management’ enhance the inherent technocratic 
orientation of development agencies, as a larger part of their resources need to be devoted to 
establishing the measurable results of their work. There is a risk that the attention for 
activities with easily measurable results stands in the way of more complex endeavours – such 
as those related to the political economy of the partner country –, the results of which are not 
easy to determine.20 There is a strong tendency for agencies to become concerned primarily 
with how things are done, while what is done is of secondary importance. 
 
Drivers of Change21 
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The Blair Government’s 1997 White Paper, Eliminating World Poverty, stressed the 
contribution of improved governance in developing countries to achieving development 
targets. ‘Governance’ in the early days of the Blair government was defined in largely 
instrumental terms and was seen to involve several ’key capabilities for the state’, related to 
accountable government, macroeconomic stability, conditions for private sector investment 
and trade, pro-poor policies, public service delivery, personal and national security, access to 
justice and anti-corruption.22 
 The need for a political economy approach to governance issues was identified at the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) in 1999, when the Head of the Governance 
Department, conceived a research project on ‘responsiveness of political systems to poverty 
reduction’.23 The idea underlying this project was that poor performance of countries on 
poverty reduction required an explanation related to the functioning of political systems, with 
particular attention for the role of accountability.24 The concern with politics led DFID’s 
Governance Department to the development of an approach called Change Forecasting, the 
objective of which was to identify whom among the political elite in developing countries 
would be interested in governance reforms, and who would not be committed to change.25 
On the basis of these first steps, DFID launched the so-called Drivers of Change (DoC) 
framework with an analysis of the ‘drivers of pro-poor change’ in Bangladesh in 2002.26 The 
direct reason for the introduction of Drivers of Change was the feeling at DFID that it would 
not be sufficient for donor agencies ‘to bring about change through technically sound 
programmes, supported in country by individual champions of reform or change’.27 In 
addition to such programmes, it was argued, knowledge would be required about governance 
realities on the ground in developing countries, in particular related to the role of formal and 
informal institutions and ‘underlying structural features’ shaping governance practices. The 
Drivers of Change methodology responded to ‘DFID’s need to understand economic, political 
and social contexts, in other words, the application of political economy analysis to 
formulation of donor strategy and implementation’.28  
Between June 2003 and September 2004, a Drivers of Change team funtioned within the 
Policy Division at DFID headquarters, which primarily served to facilitate analyses at country 
level and did not impose a single methodology. After September 2004, a much smaller policy 
team was set up only for coordination activities.29 Thus, the Drivers of Change programme 
typically led to the commissioning of analyses by DFID country offices from teams of 
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independent local and international consultants. Altogether, consultants have produced some 
twenty-five reports30 that all followed the programme’s broad conceptual model.  
By analysing three different aspects of economic, political and social contexts (agents, 
structural features and institutions), the Drivers of Change methodology attempted to uncover 
the factors that contribute to or impede change. Agents are individuals and organisations 
pursuing particular interests, including political elites, the judiciary, the military, civil society 
organisations and the media. Structural features relate to ‘deeply embedded’ factors as the 
history of state formation, natural resources, economic and social structures, and urbanisation. 
Institutions are the formal and informal ‘rules governing the behaviour of agents’, and range 
from laws and official procedures to social and cultural norms.31 As Mustaq Khan has noted 
in a review of various Drivers of Change studies, the common assumption underlying those 
studies seems to have been that certain ‘good governance reforms’ are a prerequisite for 
further development and transformation in aid-receiving countries.32 The main issues 
appeared to be the sequencing of reforms and the identification of the change agents to bring 
about such governance reforms. 
Assessments of the Drivers of Change approach have pointed at various weaknesses that 
limited the usefulness of the framework. In a review of the first twenty reports, Leftwich 
focused on the lack of rigour underlying the Drivers of Change studies.33 He noted that the 
studies performed under the broad umbrella of Drivers of Change displayed considerable 
variance in the use of central concepts such as agents, structural features and institutions. 
Moreover, Leftwich argued, the studies did not produce a convincing view on possible 
dynamics of change, as the interrelations among agents, institutions and structures were not 
well specified. Finally, Leftwich indicated that there was not a clear, shared understanding 
among the Drivers of Change analyses of what ‘political economy’ actually is. 
Various commentators have argued that several factors limited the applicability of the 
Drivers of Change approach to programming exercises and concrete policy decisions.34 
Importantly, the timing of Drivers of Change studies was often not well aligned with the 
preparation of DFID’s country programmes. Further, many Drivers of Change analyses 
proved to be highly descriptive, oriented to specific local political processes and did not 
provide operational conclusions.35 
The history of the Drivers of Change approach indicates that its initial driving force was 
located at DFID headquarters, within the Governance Department, and that the method was 
soon left to the country offices. At the country level, particular DFID staff members turned 
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out to be champions of the approach in later years. Yet, despite the fact that they found the 
analyses useful to get a better understanding of the local political economy, the approach did 
not provide them with solutions for the dilemmas they faced in their day-to-day work and 
played a limited role in the revision of country strategies.36 In the end, Drivers of Change 
analyses appear to have run up to the limitations of the practical nature of development work, 
where staff feel pressure to increase spending and work on programmes in the light of the 
Millennium Development Goals.  
The lofty goals of understanding realities better may thus ‘not be well aligned with donor 
incentives to demonstrate short term impact, respond to their own taxpayers and lobby groups, 
and to spend the allocated aid resources’.37 Moreover, for individual staff members  
 
internal, organisational incentives [supporting] continued development and implementation 
of DOC work … are relatively weak [and require] more visible support from senior staff, 
as well as changes in human resource management systems, in order to demonstrate 
(through performance assessment, promotions and postings) that skills in political analysis, 
and country level knowledge, are valued and rewarded.38  
 
The conclusion must, then, be that Drivers of Change has served mainly as a means for 
enhancing the understanding of staff at DFID country offices and country specialists at 
headquarters about the political-economic realities in partner countries.39 The approach has 
failed to have a lasting impact on policy making, as is reflected in its apparent disappearance 
in recent years. 
 
The Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis 
Dutch policy making on development has demonstrated a commitment to principles of ‘good 
governance’ ever since the arrival of social-democrat Eveline Herfkens as Minister for 
Development Cooperation in 1998. Herfkens, who had previously served as Executive 
Director at the World Bank, changed the orientation of Dutch development assistance by 
embracing aid selectivity, in that a limited set of countries were chosen for Dutch bilateral 
development assistance on the basis of ‘the presence of good policies and good governance in 
the recipient countries’.40 
 Subsequent Ministers for Development Cooperation (christian-democrat Agnes van 
Ardenne and social-democrat Bert Koenders) increased the number of Dutch partner countries 
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from 22 to over 30, while maintaining a concern with governance in aid-recipient countries. 
Koenders considered ‘good governance’ to be ‘a huge boost for development’,41 and 
emphasised that a ‘more political conception of good governance’ should be applied.42 His 
call for a political strategy for good governance was grounded in attention for the ‘context’ 
that influences the success of policies aimed at fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of 
law and building democracy.43 
 The so-called Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA), which had been 
conceived by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation at the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 2006 and was introduced in 2007, resonated well with Koenders’ views on 
governance. Despite the Minister’s enthusiasm for the new tool, SGACA appears to have had 
a similar fate as the Drivers of Change approach. SGACA was introduced by the Human 
Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid (DMH) Department with the clear aim of 
integrating the analysis with standard policy making procedures at the Ministry. The 
instrument was given a role in the design of Multi-annual Strategic Plans per embassy with 
the intention of enhancing the ‘operational’ value of the analyses.  
The introduction of SGACA took place after a lengthy period of internal discussions at the 
Ministry about the proper way to integrate governance-oriented concerns into Dutch 
development policy, during which the need to understand ‘informal’ governance processes 
was expressed very clearly.44 The main champion of SGACA was the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ DMH Department. After a period of rivalry with the Department for Effectiveness 
and Quality (DEK), the two Departments agreed that their mutual involvement with ‘good 
governance’ would be solved by a division of labour: where DMH would deal with issues of 
‘legitimacy’, DEK would be in charge of ‘effectiveness’.45 DEK, which had been the 
Ministry’s primary responsible for the provision of macro-economic (budget) support, for 
instance as part of debt relief, had developed the ‘track record’ instrument for ascertaining the 
degree to which partner countries would qualify for general or sectoral budget support.46 DEK 
displayed a generally sceptical attitude towards the SGACA approach, as they felt that the 
results of political economy analyses, which zero in on accountability mechanisms and 
practices of corruption, could impact on the attitude in Parliament towards the provision of 
budget support.47 
The starting point of the SGACAs was the so-called Power and Change Analysis (PCAs), 
which would be a political-economy assessment aiming to bring out what are the 
determinants, in state-society relationships, of countries’ governance problems. According to 
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the SGACA framework, the ‘underlying assumption’ of the analysis is ‘that building more 
effective, accountable states and public institutions requires a political process of interaction 
between the state and (organised groups in) society’.48 
The SGACAs’ Power and Change Analyses addressed, in a similar way as the Drivers of 
Change studies, three aspects of the political economy of aid-receiving developing countries: 
the ‘foundational factors’, the ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘here and now’ (the current context 
and main actors and stakeholders).49 The approach envisaged that operational implications 
would be derived from the SGACAs during workshops organised at the embassies.50 As it 
was put in the SGACA framework: 
 
The PCA can help with refining existing choices or making new ones, by enhancing 
understanding of context (the underlying causes of bad governance and weak 
development); and highlighting opportunities and threats arising from that context that 
should inform all donor interventions.51 
 
The first of 29 completed SGACA exercises started from the assumption that the Power 
and Change Analyses would be ‘quick scans’, on the basis of governance assessments made 
by the Dutch embassies (the so-called ‘track records’, see above) and other readily available 
material. A pilot project, in the second quarter of 2007, led to an increase of the time allocated 
to the work of the international and local consultants in order to provide more solid analyses. 
Despite the increase of resources allocated to the analyses, interviews52 with direct 
observers of the SGACA exercises indicate that the quality of the SGACAs has been highly 
variable. In certain cases, the limited expertise of the consultants was mentioned as a cause of 
poor quality, while in other cases the relative failure of SGACAs was ascribed to the lack of 
interest among embassy staff. Most observers agree that the decision by the Minister for 
Development Cooperation to bring the drafting of the Multi-annual Strategic Plans (MASPs) 
for 2009–2012 forward had important negative impacts on the SGACA process. As fewer 
than half of all 29 SGACAs had been completed by the time the MASPs were finalised at the 
beginning of 2008, most SGACA reports failed to feed into decision making on multi-annual 
programming.  
The lack of support for the SGACA exercises seems, at least in part, due to a similar logic 
that was noted in the section on Drivers of Change above. The scepticism at the Department 
for Effectiveness and Quality is an expression of the common ‘bureaucratic politics’ that 
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exists in any Ministry and that is related to the perceived threats emanating from projects 
undertaken by other Departments. In addition to this, regional Departments in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs expressed their fear that the analysis of the political-economic reality of 
partner countries would damage their relationships with governments.53 Similar fears were 
present at Dutch embassies in the partner countries, as they undoutedly felt the threat of 
political fallout from reports on patronage and corruption on their budget support to country 
governments, and these added to the feelings of a general lack of ownership at the embassies. 
A good number of embassy staff saw the SGACA exercise as an imposition by the 
headquarters in The Hague, which interfered with their normal way of doing development 
business in the partner country. Passive resistance during the planning of SGACAs and 
reluctance to participate actively in the implementation of the political economy analyses 
were the main signs of the lack of ownership at embassy level. The SGACA end-of-project 
review summed up the embassies’ attitude to the exercises by comparing them to a trip to the 
dentist: they were seen as ‘something to be endured and ideally to be as short as possible’.54 
The outcome of bureaucratic quibbles at headquarters and lack of support throughout the 
organisation was also noted by one senior consultant, who made quite a damning statement 
about the exercise: 
 
Fundamentally, implementation was the main problem, as there were internal problems 
within the ministry, as well as problems in the relationship between Departments. Ministry 
staff basically had no idea as to how really address governance issues. People never got 
seriously down to analysing what type of changes would be needed. Apart from the 
Minister’s commitment, there was no leadership within the organisation to implement 
SGACA and the governance programmes. The process was not just mismanaged, it was 
not managed at all.55 
  
The SGACA process came to an end only little more than three years after its inception. 
The Human Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid Department has been 
considering an ‘action plan’ in order to bring the usefulness of ‘political economy thinking’ to 
the attention of embassy staff, but this idea has been abandoned in early 2010. Instead of the 
action plan, a set of briefing papers on the salient components of the SGACA exercise has 
been produced for staff at Dutch embassies and at the Ministry.56 The fate of SGACA seems, 
therefore, rather similar to that of the Drivers of Change, as its main value is seen to derive 
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from the contribution that political economy analysis has on the understanding of embassy 
staff regarding interests and power struggles in the partner countries. 
 
Political Economy Analysis, Policy Reform and Political Risk 
The World Bank has come a long way in its thinking about the political economy of 
governance practices. During the 1990s, the Bank was leading the introduction of notions of 
governance to the development discourse, in recognition of the failure of the purely macro-
economic focus of the ‘Washington Consensus’. The World Bank’s  engagement with 
governance showed an attempt to avoid political aspects by  arguing that ‘governance may be 
relevant to the Bank’s work if it is addressed in terms of having good order and discipline in 
the management of a country’s resources’.57 
The World Development Report 2002 was premised on the notion that markets are the 
central element of development: ‘income from participating in the market is the key to 
boosting economic growth for nations and to reducing poverty for individuals’.58 The main 
challenge in fighting poverty was almost reduced to a micro-economic issue: it would involve 
creating opportunities and incentives for poor people to make use of markets.59 ‘Good 
governance’ precepts would limit the role of the state to that of a regulator. The World 
Development Report 2002 distinguished four elements, in particular, as tasks of a well-
governed state: the securing of property rights, regulation aimed at promoting competition, 
macro-economic policies for stimulating market activity, and the fight against corruption.60 
In a self-assessment published in 2005, the World Bank embraced some significant 
conceptual and theoretical innovations that contained an implicit criticism of and distancing 
from its earlier apolitical, technocratic approach. Interestingly, the self-assessment argues:  
 
Perhaps the most important lesson of the 1990s is that technocratic responses to 
improve governance work only in very auspicious settings – where there is committed 
leadership, a broadly based coalition in support of reform, and sufficient capacity to 
carry the reform process forward. ... Meeting the challenge requires a good 
understanding of the political dimensions of reform, and, in particular, of how reform 
can be used to identify and build constituencies that are capable of sustaining the reform 
momentum.61 
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Although the report seemed to display much greater sensitivity to political dynamics than in 
the past, the ‘guidelines’ for policy reform as formulated by the Bank remained limited to the 
creation of incentives for economic actors, the pursuit of growth strategies and the creation of 
institutional conditions for a favourable investment climate.62 
 More recent approaches presented by the World Bank appear to signal a change in 
orientation. In particular, a report of the Social Development Department and a so-called 
‘good practice framework’, published by the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management (PREM) Network stand out as representatives of seemingly new thinking on 
political processes within the Bank.63 Given the interpretation of the overall orientation of the 
development community and the incentives inherent to their functioning, it is, however, 
doubtful whether the Bank’s new ideas will produce more than ‘the next “fix”, limited to a 
narrow and fairly mechanistic kind of stakeholder analysis’.64 
 The Social Development Department’s approach to the political economy of policy reform 
is based on Poverty and Social Impact Analysis in specific sectors, such as agriculture and 
water. The ‘political economy of reform’ revolves around three distinctive elements: the 
reform context, the reform arena and the reform process.65 The reform context relates to the 
socio-economic, political, cultural and historical institutions that impact on reform. The 
reform arena includes societal ‘rules of the game’, stakeholders and their interests. The reform 
process refers to ‘information flows, voice and public debate’ that determine who sets the 
agenda for reform and how proposed policy changes are communicated.66 Together, the three 
elements set an ‘action framework’ that comprises elements such as: the timing and 
sequencing of reforms, analysis of the ‘demand and supply’ of reform in order to build 
coalitions for change, and partnership and public communication strategies.67 The ultimate 
aim of the political economy of policy reform appear to be to assess ‘the most significant 
political economy and political risks to policy reform’. By gaining knowledge on how 
political economy and political ‘variables’ impact on the outcome of reform processes, 
development agencies should increase their options for influencing the political-economic 
risks and opportunities.68 
In line with the political economy of policy reform, the PREM Network’s ‘problem-driven 
governance and political economy analysis’ is also set up in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Bank’s interventions.69 The Bank, so much is clear from the framework, 
stresses the instrumental nature of its approach, as governance and political economy analysis 
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can help to anticipate and manage risks – including risks of reform failure, of Bank-
supported reforms triggering unintended negative consequences, as well as potential 
reputational risks. It can also assist in transmitting important knowledge about 
institutions and stakeholders more quickly and effectively to staff newly joining a 
country or other operational team.70 
 
In line with most other approaches, ‘problem-driven governance and political economy 
analysis’ distinguishes three ‘clusters of drivers’: structures, institutions and actors or 
stakeholders.71 Together, these clusters impact on political and public sector action and, 
ultimately, on the outcomes of policies, such as growth, poverty reduction and provision of 
public goods. 
 The problem-driven nature of the approach is linked to its focus on specific problems or 
issues that appear to be spurred by particular ‘governance and political economy weaknesses’. 
On the basis of the identification of such problems, the approach would proceed to the second 
‘layer’ of uncovering the institutional and governance arrangements in society and ‘drill 
down’ to the third ‘layer’ where the three mentioned clusters of political economy drivers  
represent obstacles to change, or opportunities for reform.72 The bottom-line of the problem-
driven approach is that reform proposals should be ‘feasible’. Rather than advocating all-
encompassing governance reform, ‘good enough governance’ should be the focus of 
development agencies.73 
Although the framework alludes to ‘country-level analysis’, specific sectors and policy 
themes receive most attention.74 It is at this level that the framework seems to see the best 
opportunities for the application of governance and political economy analysis. In particular, 
the authors of the framework suggest three options to the Bank. In the first place, analyses 
would inform Bank staff teams how to adjust strategies and operations to existing 
opportunities for change. Further, such analyses would enhance and broaden the policy 
dialogue with country governments. Finally, findings of the governance and political 
economy analyses would point out opportunities for supporting change proactively.75 
On the basis of the two political economy approaches propagated in World Bank circles, 
one is led to conclude that the changes to the Bank’s approach, if any, have taken largely an 
instrumental character. Unsworth’s expectation that a predominantly ‘mechanistic kind of 
stakeholder analysis’76 would prevail has, so far, not been falsified. The above discussion has 
made clear that knowledge about the political economy of borrowing countries is considered 
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relevant mostly for judging what are the main limits to implementing policy reform, and how 
political risks can be minimised. The World Bank’s earlier plea, in the stock-taking exercise 
of 2005 (quoted above), that more attention should be paid to the ‘political dimensions of 
reform’ seems to have had only limited impact on its day-to-day operations. The World 
Bank’s operations in the developing world through the International Development 
Association have remained ‘business as usual’. It remains to be seen whether ‘political 
economy’ will change Bank practices in the future. 
The Bank’s application of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) may 
illustrate the limited impact that political economy analysis has had so far for the Bank’s 
policy on lending to developing countries. The CPIA, which was introduced at the end of the 
1990s in order to render IDA allocations more sensitive to recipient countries’ reform of 
policies and governance, has been one of the most fiercely criticised instruments in 
international development financing.77 Much of the criticism of the instrument centres on its 
neo-liberal, market-oriented bias. Despite a recent revision of the CPIA methodology, 
assessments of country performance in the 2008-11 period are being determined, for about 
two-thirds, by a governance-related cluster of five measures.78 These measures are:  
• property rights and rule-based governance; 
• quality of budgetary and financial management; 
• efficiency of revenue mobilization; 
• quality of public administration; and 
• transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector. 
Thus, the emphasis of IDA’s governance assessments continues to be on impediments for 
private-sector activity, on public sector management in relation to public finance, taxation and 
service delivery, and on checks on government. There are no signs that the allocation of loans 
to developing countries has become less performance-based and less reliant on the 
technocratic and market-oriented CPIA. Further, it is not clear how the change in thinking on 
political economy analysis is reflected in actual lending practices, nor how the awareness of 
political dimensions of reform is featured into projects and programmes aimed at 
strengthening governance in developing countries. On the basis of information that is 
available at the time or writing, the changes advocated in the two new political economy 
frameworks seem to have little impact on day-to-day World Bank policy practices. 
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Conclusion 
The discussion in this article of various approaches to political economy analysis has 
indicated that such instruments do not sit very comfortably among the range of tasks 
undertaken by development agencies. The unease of development agencies does not seem to 
derive from the objectives of this type of analysis – which is generally understood and 
endorsed, at least at the level of policy-makers at headquarters – but is a consequence of the 
way in which the agencies define their own tasks, and of the internal operation that is a result 
of the structure of their organisational interests. 
Three examples (the UK’s Drivers of Change, the Dutch Strategic Governance and 
Corruption Analysis and the World Bank’s approaches to political economy analysis) have 
been discussed in the article. Despite their pretensions the former two approaches did not 
produce many concrete results in terms of day-to-day policy making. The Drivers of Change 
and the SGACA in the end seemed mainly to serve for enhancing the understanding among 
embassy or country office staff of the political-economic realities in the countries they are 
posted to. Vagueness of the methodologies appears to have been a factor contributing to the 
limited use of the approaches, as was the lack of operational embedding. The launching by the 
World Bank of a political economy framework has not appeared to have changed dramatically 
the way the Bank is dealing with governance issues. Its sectoral application of political 
economy analysis seems to be ‘inward-looking’, in that it aims to limit the risk of reform 
failure and reputational risk. The increased attention for political aspects of governance, 
which dates back at least to a major self-assessment published in 2005, has not impacted on 
the way the Bank deals with lending to developing countries, as the IDA’s main diagnostic 
tool remains biased to technocratic and market-oriented performance indicators. 
The examples illustrate that development agencies have many traits of an epistemic 
community, which implies that their staff have a more or less common outlook on the world 
and share a set of values and norms related to poverty reduction and advancing development 
in countries of the global South. This outlook leads to a rather instrumental approach to 
development programmes and projects, which tends to pay little attention to political struggles 
and power relations and defines governance in predominantly a-political terms. Staff are 
motivated, in the first place, by ‘doing development’ in a professional way, which implies 
choosing the best instruments for obtaining a maximum of results. 
In addition to their shared norms and values, the structure of incentives within 
development agencies is an important determinant of the outlook of development 
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professionals on the issue of politics. For staff, ‘doing development’ implies managing and 
implementing programmes and projects, and disbursing funds to partner organisations – 
predominantly governments, but also others – in order to obtain results. The depoliticised 
understanding of development is instrumental for development professionals, as this helps 
them focus on the key elements of their work, without being ‘distracted’ by the potential 
conflicts of interest among their partners and the power implications of development 
processes. 
The technocratic and a-political framing of governance will not, of course surprise readers 
of the work of well-known authors such as James Ferguson and John Harriss. Ferguson, who 
focused on the implementation of development policies in Lesotho, and Harriss, who analysed 
the usage of ‘social capital’ by the World Bank, pointed out already long ago that the 
international development community is operating as an ‘anti-politics machine’.79 More 
recently, Sue Unsworth, the former Chief Governance Advisor at the UK’s Department for 
International Development, argued that donor agencies find it inherently ‘hard to come to 
terms with politics’.80 
 The tension between the fundamentally depoliticised understanding of governance and the 
call for political sensitivity should probably be acknowledged as one of the inherent 
characteristics of ‘Aidland’.81 Those responsible for policy-making on development 
assistance, usually at headquarters, generally recognise the need for more fundamental, 
political or political-economy, analysis of development reality behind the ‘façade’ of formal 
political institutions. People out ‘in the field’, however, will generally understand that 
interests are part of the development process, but tend to set the priorities for their own day-
to-day activities differently under the influence of the incentives that have been discussed 
above. Although the current framework of international development seems to require a 
‘political understanding of aid delivery’ by  development agencies,82 it is unlikely that the 
persistent emphasis on ‘doing development’ will give way to a more profound engagement 
with politics. The irony is that as long as development practice is seen as an expert activity, 
not an act of politics, the development ‘industry’ will continue to operate as the ‘anti-politics 
machine’ that it has always been.83 
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